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Abstract 
This paper addresses in a systematic demographic manner the 
widely discussed question: To what extent can immigration compensate for 
low fertility in Europe? We begin with a set of 28 alternative scenarios 
combining seven different fertility levels with four different migration 
assumptions at the level of the EU-15 to 2050. Next, we address the research 
question in the context of probabilistic population projections, and the new 
concept of conditional uncertainty distributions in population forecasting is 
introduced. Statistically this is done by sorting one thousand simulations into 
low, medium, and high groups for fertility and migration according to the 
average levels of paths over the simulation period. The results show a similar 
picture to that of the probability-free scenarios, but also indicate that for the 
old-age dependency ratio, the uncertainty about future mortality trends 
greatly adds to the ranges of the conditional uncertainty distributions. 
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The decline of European birth rates to levels well below those 
required for the full replacement of one generation and the associated 
prospects of rapid population ageing have given rise to a discussion of the 
question, to what degree immigration of young adults from outside Europe 
could fill this gap. The underlying reasoning is that the volume of 
immigration could be more easily determined by government policies than 
the level of Europe’s birth rate. It also assumes that rapid population ageing 
will have negative implications for Europe’s social and economic structure 
and for global competitiveness. These are all highly complex questions with 
many political, economic, and even cultural dimensions that shall not be 
discussed here. Instead, this paper will only discuss the strictly demographic 
dimension of this question: What are the implications for Europe’s 
population size and structure of alternative future fertility levels combined 
with alternative levels of immigration? We will present the results of 28 
scenarios that combine seven different fertility levels with four different 
migration levels for the current 15 member countries of the EU to 2050. In 
the second part, we discuss this question in the more complex framework of 
probabilistic population projections for the EU. We will introduce the 
concept of conditional uncertainty distributions and compare the 
distributions that result from the combination of different fertility and 
migration ranges given the full range of mortality uncertainty. This provides 
the reader with more information than the simple if-then scenarios in the first 
part. 
The question used as the title of this paper has gained wide public 
prominence following the publication of a UN study entitled “Replacement 
Migration: Is it a solution to declining and ageing populations?” (UN 2000). 
This study presents several scenarios for a set of eight countries as well as 
Europe and the EU as aggregates. One scenario computes and assumes the 
migration required to maintain the size of total population; another keeps the 
working-age population constant; and finally, one maintains the support 
ratio, i.e., the proportion of the population aged 15-64 over the population 65 
or older. For the individual countries, the results show that significant 
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immigration can result in constant population sizes and even constant sizes 
of the working age population, whereas the support ratio can only be 
maintained with implausibly high immigration levels. The absurd number of 
5.1 billion immigrants necessary to maintain a constant support ratio until 
2050 in the Republic of Korea has received a lot of attention in this context. 
For the European Union (EU-15) these calculations show that a total of 47.5 
million (or 0.95 million per year) migrants would be required to keep the 
population size constant; 79.4 million (or 1.6 million per year) would be 
needed to maintain the working-age population; and an impossible 674 
million (13.5 million per year) would be needed to keep the support ratio 
constant. It was interesting to see that in terms of public reactions to these 
calculations, one could find opposing conclusions ranging from 
“immigration can never solve the ageing problem” to “immigration is 
urgently needed to solve the ageing problem.” 
This UN study chose an approach that works completely top down 
or more precisely “back from the future.” A certain demographic target 
(such as keeping the support ratio constant) is set and then one calculates 
what immigration would be needed to achieve this goal, assuming invariant 
paths of future fertility and mortality, i.e., viewing migration as the only 
policy variable. From a purely computational point of view, such 
calculations are certainly possible and legitimate, although they may not be 
very meaningful. We see two main problems with the publication and broad 
dissemination of this kind of study. One has to do with public perception, the 
other with the nature of demographic evolution. The problem with the public 
perception of such studies is that inevitably people take the (hypothetically) 
set target as a real target, moving immediately to the processes that will 
achieve the target without questioning the meaning of the target. In the 
classic schools of rhetoric this is a famous trick identified by the ancient 
Greek in order to manipulate the listener in a certain direction. We certainly 
do not want to imply that the authors of this study had manipulation in mind, 
but only point to the mechanism through which many commentators were 
led to not discuss whether, e.g., a constant labour force is a meaningful 
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political goal, but took this for granted and immediately moved to the 
discussion of migration policies. The second problem with this approach is 
that real populations do not evolve “back from the future.” Demographic 
trends tend to be determined by past and current contexts and evolve as these 
contexts change. Even policy makers who should orient their current policies 
on anticipated future conditions do not think in terms of strictly demographic 
targets, but rather in terms of the sustainability of social security systems, 
which are based on many more parameters than the strictly demographic 
ones. In the context of discussing the “replacement migration” study, 
demographer David Coleman of Oxford once warned of the danger of what 
he called “demographism,” i.e., reducing the complex world to simple 
demographic numbers (personal communication). 
In this study, we try to avoid the problems described above by 
having a different approach: we combine a range of different possible and 
plausible evolutions of fertility rates over the coming decades with a range 
of different possible and plausible immigration levels. Calculations are 
performed at the level of the European Union (with its current 15 member 
states). In the following section, this will be done through the discussion of 
28 probability-free scenarios. Later we will discuss the approach in the 
context of new probabilistic population projections. 
 
SCENARIOS COMBINING ALTERNATIVE FERTILITY 
AND MIGRATION LEVELS 
Figures 1 and 2 present selected findings from a large number of 
different simulations that were calculated at the level of the EU-15 with a 
population of 376 million in 2000. Since the discussion of this question 
mainly concerns the long-term impacts, the figures only show the results for 
2050. They are based on alternative population projections in which fertility 
and net migration are kept constant over time at the level indicated, while 
mortality – the third component of population change – is improving slowly 
as assumed in the regular projections (see below). The figures group the 
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projection results by the assumed total fertility rate (TFR) ranging from 1.0 
to 2.2. For 1999 Eurostat gives a TFR of 1.45 for the EU-15, which covers a 
range from Spain (1.19), Italy (1.21), Greece (1.30), and Austria (1.30) at the 
low end, to Denmark (1.74), Finland (1.74), France (1.77), and Ireland (1.89) 
at the high end (European Commission 2001). The different bars under each 
fertility assumption refer to different assumed levels of net migration gain. 
For 1999 Eurostat estimates a positive net migration rate of 1.9 (per 1,000 
population) for the EU-15, which in absolute terms implies a migration gain 
of 714,000 persons (European Commission 2001). Over the past decade, 
however, migration flows have shown strong annual fluctuations and great 
differences between the 15 member states. The figures show the results for 
four different levels of annual net migration, ranging from zero (no 
migration gains) at the low end to a constant annual gain of 1.2 million, 
which over the 50-year period would accumulate to a 60 million immigration 
surplus. 
Figure 1 presents the results with respect to the total population size 
of today’s EU-15. Not surprisingly, the lowest population size in 2050 (271 
million or a 28 percent decline from today) results from the combination of a 
TFR of 1.0 with the assumption of zero net migration gains. At the high end, 
the combination of a TFR of 2.2 with a 1.2 million annual migration gain 
results in a population size of 431 million in 2050, which is an increase of 15 
percent as compared to today. The Eurostat projections, which combine 
fertility and migration assumptions that are considered most plausible as of 
today (baseline scenarios), give a total population size of 364 million for 
2050, which is a decline of about 3 percent (European Commission 2001). 
Of all the alternative scenarios included in the figure, the overwhelming 
majority points toward population decline, but the impacts and the 
differences among the scenarios are not too dramatic considering that it 
reflects the change over half a century. This shows that total population size 
is a rather inert variable, and even rather extreme combinations of 
assumptions affect it only very slowly. 
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Figure 1  Total population of the EU-15 in 2050, according to alternative 
projections assuming a wide range of fertility and annual net migration 
levels. The level of 2000 is marked as a black line. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows that the population age structure is expected to 
change more rapidly and more profoundly than population size. The graph 
plots the so-called old-age dependency ratio, which is defined here as the 
proportion of the population above age 65 divided by the population aged 
15-64. At the level of the EU-15 this ratio is presently 0.24. Due to the 
inevitable changes that are mostly pre-programmed in the current age 
structure of the population, this ratio is bound to increase significantly under 
all scenarios. Up to 2050 this dependency ratio will increase by a factor of 
roughly two to three depending on the future fertility and migration levels 
assumed. It is interesting to see that even massive immigration to Europe 
makes little difference for the old-age dependency ratio. This difference is 
somewhat more pronounced in the case of very low assumed fertility and 
less pronounced for the higher fertility scenarios. Even in the extreme case 
of 60 million young immigrants added to the EU labour force, over the next 
five decades the expected increase in the old-age dependency ratio would be 
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only slightly more moderate than under current migration rates and even not 
very significantly different from the other extreme case of no migration 
gains. 
 
Figure 2  Old-age dependency ratio for the EU-15 in 2050, according to 
alternative projections assuming a wide range of fertility and annual net 
migration levels. The level of 2000 is marked as a black line. 
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PROBABILISTIC PROJECTIONS CONDITIONAL TO 
DIFFERENT FERTILITY AND MORTALITY LEVELS 
While the above-described scenarios are based on conventional 
demographic projection methods, this section introduces a methodologically 
innovative element in the rapidly expanding field of probabilistic population 
projections. This field cannot be described here, but has been extensively 
documented elsewhere (Lutz et al. 1999, 2001). There have been essentially 
three major approaches for deriving probabilities, i.e., quantitative 
assessments of the uncertainty ranges for future demographic trends (time 
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series models that assume structural continuity and extend past variances in 
vital rates into the future); assessments of the errors in past population 
projections, which assume that future errors will be of the same nature; and 
magnitude and assessments of uncertainty based on expert arguments. Since 
it is obvious that all three approaches cover important aspects of the 
question, and that all of them include elements of expert judgment, a 
synthesis of the three approaches has occurred. One such synthesis has 
recently been developed and applied to the projection of 13 world regions by 
Lutz et al. (2001). The projections presented here are based on this model; 
the methodology is described in the supplementary information to Lutz et al. 
(2001) and can be downloaded from www.nature.com. Since the world 
regions in Lutz et al. (2001) do not include the EU-15 as a distinct region, 
the projections presented here represent the first projections for the EU-15 
based on that methodology. 
Generally speaking, probabilistic projections are an attempt at 
providing the users of projections with more information than contained in 
one best guess forecast or in completely probability-free, if-then scenarios. 
Most users of population projections tend to be satisfied with one projected 
future path that tells them what experts assume to be the most likely trend in 
the future. Such a best guess projection will suffice for many applications. In 
some instances, however, users also want some information about the 
uncertainty involved in the projections. This is especially the case if there is 
some cost involved in erring. If, for instance, construction plans for new 
schools are based on projections about the number of children in certain 
areas, it can mean high costs if the projections turn out to be wrong. Hence, 
in rational decision processes, cost functions are usually combined with risk 
functions. Only fully probabilistic projections can provide such risk 
functions. 
One common way to deal with uncertainty in population trends is to 
define alternative scenarios on fertility, mortality, and migration, and 
calculate their implications in terms of population size and structure. Such 
scenarios are simply exercises in population dynamics and cannot tell the 
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users whether the described future path is more or less likely, whether it 
should be taken seriously as something to prepare for, or whether it can be 
disregarded as a low probability scenario. This is clearly the case for the 
above-described scenarios, in which we do not tell the user which fertility or 
migration paths are more likely to happen than others. The variants approach 
(still) used by the UN Population Division and many national statistical 
agencies is an attempt to move from completely probability-free scenarios to 
giving the user a “plausible range” defined by high, medium, and low 
variants. As more extensively discussed elsewhere (Lutz et al. 1999) this 
variants approach is inappropriate for three distinct reasons. 1) The variants 
can only vary one of the three demographic components, which in most 
cases is fertility, thus disregarding the significant uncertainties about future 
mortality and migration trends. 2) This approach does not tell the user what a 
“plausible range” means: does it cover 100 percent of all possible cases, or 
only 50 percent, or something in between? 3) The approach is 
“probabilistically inconsistent” (National Research Council 2000) when 
aggregating results, e.g., summing up all the high variants for different 
countries to obtain a regional high variant because it requires the additional 
very strong and implausible assumption that national trends are perfectly 
correlated. For these reasons, the authors are convinced that the variants 
approach represents a bad compromise between probability-free scenarios on 
the one hand, and fully probabilistic projections on the other. Hence, 
depending on the purpose of the exercise, either of the two, i.e., probability-
free scenarios or fully probabilistic projections, should be chosen. 
Probabilistic projections as published in the literature so far, 
however, have one important disadvantage for policy making. They only 
provide the user with one unconditional distribution of possible future 
population trends without being able to show, for example, the consequences 
of alternative immigration policies. For this reason, when IIASA presented 
its global-level probabilistic projections for the first time (Lutz 1996), it also 
maintained a separate chapter presenting alternative scenarios to serve the 
purpose of evaluating the longer-term consequences of alternative paths. 
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Here we suggest that this duality of presenting both scenarios and 
probabilistic projections is not necessary to meet the demand by users to see 
the consequences of alternative fertility, mortality, and migration paths. 
Within the framework of fully probabilistic scenarios, it is possible to satisfy 
this demand through the presentation of conditional distributions. This can 
be done simply by grouping 1,000 simulated paths that are used to generate 
the uncertainty distribution of output parameters into subsets of simulations 
defined by specific ranges of the input parameters. Table 1 presents the 
results of a grouping that distinguishes between three different fertility 
ranges and three different migration ranges with the range of the mortality 
paths being unrestricted.1 
Table 1 has six parts, which give the results for such conditional 
probabilistic population projections for the EU in terms of different output 
parameters. For each of the output variables the results are given in terms of 
nine cells, which show the results for the simulation runs that result from 
three different migration ranges (given across) and three different fertility 
ranges (from top to bottom). All fertility and migration paths have been 
sorted by the average level of TFR and net migration over the projection 
period 2000-2050. For fertility the lowest simulation run has an average TFR 
of 1.08 over the entire period. The highest average TFR is 2.20. Since these 
values are averages and the simulated paths have quite strong annual 
fluctuations, the TFR range in any particular year may lie well outside this 
range. The assumptions underlying these projections are based on a 
distribution of the TFR in 2030 in which 80 percent of the range lies 
between 1.2 and 2.2 with the median at 1.7. For the level of annual net 
migration, the 80 percent range is from zero to 1 million, i.e., in any year the 
difference of immigrants to the EU and emigrants from the EU lies with a 
probability of 80 percent within the range of zero and 1 million, with the 
                                            
1 It should be stressed that the fertility and migration distribution within the lower 
and high thirds are not symmetric since they are derived from the overall normal 
distribution. 
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median at half a million. As the labels for the three groups of average net-
migration levels show, individual average paths may well lie outside these 
80 percent ranges. 
The first panel gives the results for the total population. The 
numbers in the nine cells that are defined by the three fertility and three 
migration ranges give the medians of the total population distributions of the 
EU-15 in 2050 from all the simulations that fall into this group. The numbers 
in parentheses below give the 80 percent uncertainty intervals. Hence, for the 
upper left cell, the results show that a combination of low fertility (the 
lowest third) and low migration gains (the lowest third of the assumed paths 
that includes net migration losses) yields a median population of 323.91 
million for the EU in 2050. This is well below the current population size of 
376 million. The 80 percent uncertainty range in this cell goes from 299 
million to 352 million. This range is due to the uncertainties in fertility and 
migration within the defined categories, and to the full uncertainty about 
future mortality trends. In this first cell, even the upper end of the 80 percent 
uncertainty range is well below the current population size, i.e., this 
combination of low fertility and low migration almost certainly leads to 
population decline. In the lower right corner we find the opposite picture. 
High fertility combined with high migration gains lead to a median 
population size of 418 million in 2050, which is well above the current size. 
Even the lower end of the 80 percent range in this cell (389 million) implies 
some increase in total population. The other seven cells lie in between these 
two extremes, with the 80 percent ranges often overlapping. It is worth 
noting that of the given ranges, the combination of high fertility with low 
migration results in a higher total population size than the combination of 
low fertility with high migration gains. 
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Table 1  Conditional uncertainty distributions (medians and 80 percent 
ranges in parentheses) for the EU-15 in 2050 by high, medium, and low 
segments of the assumed fertility and migration paths. 
TFR  Migration  
  (-175394-438533) (438533-667560) (667560-1244037) 
Total population 
in millions    
 
(1.08-1.53) 
323.91 
(299.11-351.73) 
344.48 
(321.23-368.88) 
359.12 
(334.41-385.43) 
 
(1.53-1.71) 
351.19 
(327.02-372.39) 
372.39 
(351.03-397.58) 
389.71 
(365.99-411.61) 
 
(1.71-2.20) 
375.34 
(348.90-407.90) 
402.32 
(369.66-434.50) 
418.06 
(388.76-450.00) 
Proportion above age 65 
 
(1.08-1.53) 
0.34 
(0.30-0.38) 
0.33 
(0.29-0.37) 
0.32 
(0.29-0.36) 
 
(1.53-1.71) 
0.32 
(0.28-0.35) 
0.31 
(0.28-0.34) 
0.30 
(0.27-0.33) 
 
(1.71-2.20) 
0.29 
(0.26-0.33) 
0.29 
(0.26-0.32) 
0.28 
(0.25-0.31) 
Proportion aged 0-15 
 
(1.08-1.53) 
0.11 
(0.08-0.12) 
0.11 
(0.08-0.13) 
0.11 
(0.09-0.13) 
 
(1.53-1.71) 
0.13 
(0.12-0.15) 
0.13 
(0.12-0.15) 
0.14 
(0.12-0.15) 
 
(1.71-2.20) 
0.16 
(0.14-0.18) 
0.16 
(0.14-0.18) 
0.16 
(0.14-0.18) 
Old-age dependency ratio 
 
(1.08-1.53) 
0.62 
(0.51-0.71) 
0.60 
(0.49-0.71) 
0.57 
(0.49-0.66) 
 
(1.53-1.71) 
0.58 
(0.49-0.69) 
0.56 
(0.49-0.63) 
0.54 
(0.46-0.61) 
 
(1.71-2.20) 
0.53 
(0.45-0.64) 
0.52 
(0.44-0.61) 
0.51 
(0.44-0.58) 
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The second panel gives the results of the conditional probabilistic 
projections for the proportion of the population above age 65. As discussed 
above, this proportion is bound to increase significantly from its current 
level of 0.163 mostly due to the already existing age structure. Even high 
fertility (almost around replacement level) combined with very high average 
migration gains (the upper third of the migration range) will lead to an 
increase, to a median of 0.28 and an associated 80 percent range of 0.25-
0.31. As one would expect, the increase in the proportion elderly is greatest 
for the combination of low fertility and low migration gains. Comparing the 
lower left with the upper right cells, again the effect of a higher fertility level 
is clearly more significant than that of higher migration levels. 
The third panel gives the results for the proportion of children aged 
0-15 in the total population. This proportion is currently 17 percent and is 
bound to decline under practically all combinations of fertility and 
migration. Only in the high fertility category, the upper end of the 80 percent 
ranges imply a small increase to 18 percent by 2030. It is evident from this 
panel that the proportion of children is almost exclusively determined by the 
level of fertility and virtually insensitive to even greatly differing migration 
levels. 
The last panel shows the projected trend in the old-age dependency 
ratio, defined as the proportion of the population aged 65 and above divided 
by the population aged 15-64. This ratio, which currently stands at 0.24, will 
increase significantly under all circumstances. This has already been 
demonstrated clearly for the deterministic scenarios above. An additional 
piece of information to be derived from these conditional probabilistic 
projections is that mortality uncertainty plays a major role in determining the 
uncertainty range of the future old-age dependency ratio. This is clearly 
visible from the fact that the 80 percent ranges given in parentheses are 
unusually broad, and that all nine ranges overlap. The lower bound in the 
cell combining low fertility with low migration (0.51) is the same level as 
the median in the cell of high fertility and high migration, and well below the 
upper bound in this cell. 
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This last point clearly demonstrates that the calculation of scenarios 
that only consider fertility and migration uncertainty and disregard mortality 
uncertainty (as given in the first section of this paper) tell only part of the 
story. In the presence of mortality uncertainty, the resulting uncertainty 
ranges for the proportions elderly and the old-age dependency ratio increase 
significantly. This is an important point of high policy relevance when it 
comes, e.g., to pension reforms; it is entirely missed by the traditional UN-
type high, medium, and low variants, as well as other scenario exercises that 
disregard mortality uncertainty. The above-cited UN replacement migration 
study falls into this category as well. 
In conclusion, this paper has made two distinct contributions. First, 
it provides a more systematic and useful consideration of the consequences 
of alternative migration levels, combined with alternative fertility levels, 
than given previously in the literature. Second, this study presents for the 
first time the concept of conditional uncertainty distributions for population 
projections, and demonstrates that this is a feasible and useful means for 
combining the policy makers’ desire for population outcomes that are 
contingent to variations in the components of change with the other well-
established advantages of probabilistic population forecasting. 
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